Background: Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) employs a variety of psycho-
The Socratic Method, which has also been labelled as Socratic questioning and Socratic dialogue, is a verbal process which employs questioning and reflection and is used within therapy to facilitate patients reaching new perspectives and forming their own conclusions regarding their dysfunctional beliefs (Clark & Egan, 2015; Kennerley, 2007) . The Socratic Method is believed to facilitate engagement with the subject of discussion, and is employed based upon the rationale that there is significant therapeutic benefit in patients verbalising their own conclusions, particularly where this may reflect a change from a previously held perspective (for review see Clark & Egan, 2015) . Whilst the Socratic Method can be used across a number of activities throughout all stages of therapy (e.g., Westbrook et al., 2011) , it is most commonly described in terms of its utility in helping patients re-evaluate cognitions.
Despite the purported importance of re-evaluating cognitions in CBT, relatively little research has evaluated the contribution of individual treatment components to CBT outcomes (McManus, Van Doorn, & Yiend, 2012) . Until recently, the impact of the Socratic Method on therapy had received little research attention and some authors have claimed that the Socratic Method is an unnecessary part of effective treatment (e.g., Fairburn, 2008) . However, there has been increasing interest in the investigation of the Socratic Method (Kazantzis, Fairburn, Padesky, Reinecke, & Teesson, 2014) . A recent survey of expert CBT therapists suggested that the Socratic Method has an important role in a number of evidence-based CBT interventions . A study by Braun et al. (2015) demonstrated that therapist use of Socratic questioning predicted session-tosession symptom change in a group of 55 adults who received CBT for depression. Furthermore, Heiniger, Clark, and Egan (2018) conducted a study which evaluated individuals' perception of Socratic and non-Socratic CBT in a community sample. Results suggested that individuals perceive information delivered via the Socratic Method to be more helpful and engaging than when this information is delivered in a didactic manner. Participants in this study also reported a preference for receiving therapy delivered via the Socratic Method over a didactic information-giving approach. However, it remains to be determined whether use of the Socratic Method to re-evaluate cognitions directly contributes to belief change and whether this results in any greater belief change than non-Socratic approaches in terms of eliciting cognitive change.
Clinicians may aim to facilitate belief change within CBT by identifying a maladaptive cognition and bringing information pertinent to this cognition into the patient's awareness (e.g., Clark & Egan, 2015; Kennerley, 2007) . This process is engaged in with the aim of encouraging the synthesis of this salient information with the target cognition. This can be done through the didactic presentation of information inconsistent with a given cognition (didactic psychoeducation). Alternatively, the Socratic Method can help draw patients' attention to their own knowledge and experience and ask them to evaluate how this information fits with their previous experience (Padesky, 1993) . It has been suggested that the Socratic Method may facilitate more elaborate processing of such information (Kennerley, 2007) and that the use of systematic questioning in the Socratic Method may facilitate inductive reasoning processes (Overholser, 1993) . However, to date, no evidence exists to demonstrate that this is the case. The Socratic Method has been acknowledged to be more time consuming and difficult for therapists to administer than a direct information-giving approach (Clark & Egan, 2015) . Consequently, it is important to establish whether there is any advantage to clinicians employing this method. Padesky (1993) defined the Socratic Method as comprising of four non-mutually exclusive stages: (1) asking informational questions to which patients know the answers so as to raise awareness of any relevant information; (2) active listening; (3) summarising; and (4) asking analytical (synthesising) questions that ask the patient to consider the new information in relation to their original beliefs. Based upon a review of the CBT literature, Clark and Egan (2015) proposed that the rationale for employing the Socratic Method in CBT is that through encouraging patients to evaluate information and reach their own conclusions the Socratic Method facilitates: (1) reductions in distress associated with unhelpful cognitions (e.g., Beck, 2011) ; (2) patient internalisation of the Socratic Method and development of critical thinking skills (Padesky & Beck, 2003) ; and (3) more "memorable and convincing" insights and conclusions (Westbrook et al., 2011, p. 139) . Assuming these assertions are correct, an approach to facilitating belief change that did not use the Socratic Method would have less successful outcomes with regards to facilitating change in unhelpful cognitions.
As outlined above, information relevant to particular cognitions can be presented to patients in a didactic manner. This method, referred to as didactic psychoeducation within this paper, is commonly used in both written text (such as self-help materials), internet CBT interventions, and within-therapy discussion. It should be noted that, for the purposes of this paper, didactic psychoeducation refers only to direct information-giving regarding a target cognition. It does not, therefore, refer to the psychological intervention labelled psychoeducation, which has demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of various psychological 72 disorders (e.g., Lukens & McFarlane, 2004; Miklowitz, George, Richards, Simoneau, & Suddath, 2003) and may include multiple elements in the delivery of information pertinent to a given psychological disorder.
In treatment, clinicians may use a combination of both the Socratic Method and didactic psychoeducation, and achieving an appropriate combination of both approaches is considered a key clinical skill in delivering CBT . However, at present, there is little evidence to guide how to balance the delivery of the two approaches. Due to its simplicity, didactic psychoeducation may be more time-efficient than the Socratic Method. Furthermore, didactic psychoeducation requires less training and, arguably, less therapeutic skill. If didactic psychoeducation were to have the same therapeutic impact (e.g., on belief change) as utilising the Socratic Method to help patients consider information then this would have significant implications for therapy and therapist decision-making regarding the use of questioning versus information-giving.
Given the lack of research into the impact information presentation style has on belief change, the present study aimed to investigate whether the method by which one becomes aware of information impacts upon the degree of belief change relevant to such information. McManus et al. (2012) established that the belief "Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will make you ill" is a belief commonly held within the general population. This belief has been demonstrated to be anxiety-provoking, one which "could be considered at least somewhat irrational" (McManus et al., 2012, p. 541) , and hence appropriate to re-evaluate. McManus et al. (2012) demonstrated that this cognition was amenable to change following a brief one-off application of a CBT change method (thought records or behavioural experiments). In addition to obtaining ratings of belief strength, McManus et al. demonstrated that the techniques targeting this specific cognition also resulted in reductions in subjective anxiety associated with this belief and the perceived likelihood of engaging in behaviour incompatible with the target cognition.
The primary aim of the present study was to compare the impact of an online analogue of the Socratic Method and didactic psychoeducation to a control condition on participant strength of belief in the predefined belief "Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will make you ill". A preselected belief was chosen, in line with the methodology of McManus et al. (2012) , in order to recruit a large sample and to keep the content of the interventions constant across participants within each condition.
The decision to evaluate an online analogue of the Socratic Method (as opposed to in-person therapist delivery) was taken for a number of reasons. First, an a priori power analysis suggested that, even assuming a large effect based on previous research regarding the reevaluation of the target cognition (McManus et al., 2012) , a minimum sample of 66 participants would be needed to detect a significant effect. Consequently an online automated delivery represented a pragmatic solution which allowed for the recruitment of a sufficient number of participants who met the study entry criteria (including the step of screening out many participants who did not), whilst mitigating against the practical restraints of a therapist/researcher engaging in this screening and intervention. Second, the online automated delivery of the Socratic analogue and didactic psychoeducation conditions ensured equivalence of withincondition verbal instructions across participants. Finally, the online analogue of the Socratic Method (described further below) isolated specific aspects of the Socratic Method argued to facilitate cognitive change (see Clark & Egan, 2015; Kennerley, 2007) ; namely, (1) identifying a pertinent target cognition; (2) using questioning to draw information and personal experiences relevant to the target cognition into participants' awareness; and (3) requiring participants to respond to a question which required them to reflect upon and synthesise this information, whilst considering the original target cognition.
A mixed within/between participant design was used with random allocation to one of three conditions. To assess the impact of the three conditions participants completed ratings of belief strength, anxiety associated with this belief, and rated the likelihood of engaging in behaviour inconsistent with this belief pre-and post-intervention. It was predicted that the Socratic analogue and didactic psychoeducation conditions would promote significant change in participants' belief ratings of the target cognition. It was also predicted that the Socratic analogue condition would promote significantly greater change in participants' belief ratings of the target cognition than didactic psychoeducation and control conditions. Finally, it was predicted that the Socratic analogue condition would promote significantly greater change in participants' anxiety and behaviour ratings related to the target cognition than didactic psychoeducation and control conditions.
Method Participants
A total of 241 participants commenced the survey. McManus et al. (2012) suggested that individuals with an initial belief rating of less than 60% in this target cognition should not be included within an evaluation of an intervention to impact upon strength of belief as lower belief ratings may be less amenable to change and/or harder to detect change in. Of the 241 participants, only 73 rated their initial strength of belief in the target cognitions as above 60% and a total of 69 (29% of initial sample) continued to the point of completion of postintervention measures. Participant characteristics across each experimental group are summarised in Table 1 .
Materials

Participant demographic questionnaire
Participants were asked to report their age, gender, highest level of educational attainment, and country of residence.
Obsessional beliefs questionnaire (OBQ-44)
The OBQ-44 (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005 ) is a 44-item measure, scored on 7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 (Disagree very much) to 7 (Agree very much). The scale was employed in order to assess presence of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) symptomology across groups as the target cognition is considered to be representative of anxiety provoking cognitions within OCD populations (McManus et al., 2012) . A total score was derived with higher scores indicating higher levels of obsessional thinking and being indicative of more severe OCD symptomology. Cronbach's α of .95 has previously been demonstrated for the OBQ-44, revealing good test-retest reliability over a 2-to 3-month interval and good validity (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005). Cronbach's α for the current study was .95.
Visual analogue scales (VAS)
A series of visual analogue scales (VAS; McManus et al., 2012) were utilised to assess strength of belief in the target cognition ("Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will make you ill"), a secondary belief ("Not washing my hands after going to the toilet will cause other people to be ill"), anxiety, and predicted behaviour associated with the target cognitions. The VAS utilised were those employed by McManus et al. (2012) to measure belief change regarding the target cognition "Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will make you ill", from 1 (Do not believe this at all) to 9 (Strongly believe this). The VAS also assessed subjective anxiety related to the target cognition by asking participants to rate "How anxious would you feel if you had to use the toilet without washing your hands afterwards?" from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Extremely). Finally, the perceived likelihood of engaging in behaviour incompatible with the target cognition was assessed through asking "How likely is it that you will use a toilet without washing your hands afterwards over the next week?" from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Extremely).
Interventions
Socratic analogue condition
The Socratic analogue condition took approximately 15 min to complete. The condition was designed to encourage consideration and possible revaluation of the target cognition by adhering to the process of exploration as outlined in a number accounts of the Socratic Method in CBT (e.g., Clark & Egan, 2015; Kennerley, 2007; Overholser, 1993; Padesky, 1993) . Specifically, the process involved asking the participant to consider the pertinent target cognition, using questioning to draw participants' attention towards personal experiences and psychoeducative information relevant to handwashing and the target cognition (including information consistent and inconsistent with the cognition). These steps were completed through participants responding to questions and information by entering text into open response text boxes. Finally, participants were asked to summarise how the specific information considered fitted with their pre-existing generalised beliefs and experience and, in doing so, synthesise the information with the original target cognition. We note that it has been questioned whether the Socratic Method can be adequately reflected in an automated online forum (Mason, 2011) and, as such, do not claim that the Socratic analogue condition reflects a true equivalent of the Socratic Method as delivered in CBT. Nevertheless, the condition involved exploration of a predefined target cognition and participants responded to questions which aimed to reflect the established stages of the Socratic Method (with the exception of empathic listening) as defined by Padesky (1993) . The process can also be seen to adhere to a process of systematic questioning which aimed to facilitate inductive reasoning as advocated in the conceptualisation of Socratic Questioning described by Overholser (1993) . The questions covered the same informational content used by McManus et al. (2012) to evaluate the chosen target cognition with participants. The steps involved were, therefore, considered to be broadly equivalent to the manner in which this cognition may be explored by a CBT therapist, within the constraints of an automated online environment.
Didactic psychoeducation condition
The didactic psychoeducation intervention took approximately 15 min and involved presenting information to participants related to the target belief and simply asked participants to confirm they had read and understood the material. Again, the information presented covered the same informational content used by McManus et al. (2012) . 
Control condition
Procedure
Approval for the project was obtained from the University of New England Human Research Committee (ref no: HE14-119). The study was advertised via social media and to first-year psychology students via an online learning platform, offering course credit for participation. Participants were excluded if they were under the age of 18, were not fluent in English, and if they reported a belief rating of the target belief below 60%. Participants were directed to a link to the Qualtrics website (Qualtrics, 2005) where they were shown an information sheet and consented to participate. Participants who identified as eligible completed a demographic questionnaire, VAS, and OBQ-44. Consenting participants were then randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions: the Socratic, didactic psychoeducation, or control condition.
Participants then completed the assigned intervention, followed by post-intervention VAS measures. The questionnaire and intervention took approximately 30 min to complete. One week post-intervention, participants were asked to complete another survey consisting of the VAS and OBQ-44. Although the pre-and postintervention measures were considered an adequate way to detect whether belief change occurred, the follow-up was included to assess the durability of the belief change. Only seven participants completed the follow-up measures and, consequently, follow-up data was not analysed within the present study.
Results
Significance testing was conducted to compare participants' characteristics across conditions. Chi-square tests for independence indicated no statistically significant differences between conditions regarding gender, education, or country of residence. In addition, one-way between groups analyses of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant differences between conditions regarding age or OBQ-44 total score.
A paired sample t-test showed that a significant effect was obtained t(16) = 3.92, p = .001 for the Socratic intervention and, in line with our prediction, belief ratings of the target cognition after the Socratic analogue condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.77) were significantly lower than before the intervention (M = 6.71, SD = 0.92). A paired sample t-test also demonstrated that a significant effect was obtained t(28) = 5.34, p < .001 for the didactic psychoeducation condition, with belief ratings of the target cognition after didactic psychoeducation (M = 5.83, SD = 2.17) being significantly lower than before the intervention (M = 7.45, SD = 1.12). The control condition (N = 23) was also observed to result in significant reduction in belief ratings regarding the target cognition from pre-intervention (M = 7.30, SD = 1.22) to post-intervention (M = 6.74, SD = 1.94) t (22) = 2.26, p = .034. Changes in belief ratings from pre-to post-intervention across each condition can be seen in Fig. 1 .
A one-way between groups ANOVA was used to investigate the effect of group on the magnitude of belief change. The result was significant, F(2, 66) = 4.51, p = .015, partial η 2 = .12. Belief change for the Socratic analogue condition (M = 2.06, SD = 2.16) was significantly greater than the control condition (M = 0.57, SD = 1.20) p = .017. However, belief change in the didactic psychoeducation condition (M = 1.62, SD = 1.63) was not significantly greater than the control condition, p = .067. Whilst the mean size of belief change in the Socratic analogue condition (M = 2.06, SD = 2.16) was greater than that in the didactic psychoeducation condition (M = 1.62, SD = 1.63), this difference was not significant p = .664. A further one-way between groups ANOVA was used to investigate the effect of group on size of belief change in the secondary belief "Not washing my hands after going to the toilet will cause other people to be ill". As with the target cognition, belief change for the Socratic analogue condition (M = 2.06, SD = 2.25) was significantly greater than the control condition (M = 0.43, SD = 1.40) p = .006. However, belief change in the didactic psychoeducation condition (M = 1.45, SD = 1.40) was not significantly greater than the control condition, p = .062. Once again, whilst the mean size of belief change in the Socratic analogue condition (M = 2.06, SD = 2.25) was greater than that in the didactic psychoeducation condition (M = 1.45, SD = 1.401), this difference was not significant p = .418. A one-way between groups ANOVA was used to investigate the effect of group on change in participants' anxiety. Contrary to expectations, the result was not significant, F(2, 66) = 0.40, p = .670, partial η 2 = .01. A one-way between groups ANOVA was also used to investigate the effect of group on change in participants' ratings of likelihood of engaging in behaviour incompatible with the target cognition. The result was not significant, F(2, 66) = 0.51, p = .603, partial η 2 = .02.
Discussion
The present study investigated whether the method by which one becomes aware of information affects the strength of a particular belief. Consistent with our predictions, the Socratic analogue and didactic psychoeducation conditions each resulted in significant change in the target belief as well as the secondary target belief. This suggests that the experimental interventions were successful, in that the target condition appeared to be amenable to change following exposure to information inconsistent with this belief using the application of a CBT change method (McManus et al., 2012) . The Socratic analogue condition led to significantly greater belief change than the control condition. In contrast, the didactic psychoeducation condition did not result in significantly greater belief change than the control condition. Despite the fact that the Socratic analogue condition displayed a significantly greater effect than the control, whilst the didactic psychoeducation condition did not, the magnitude of belief change in the Socratic analogue condition was not significantly greater than the didactic psychoeducation condition. The observed differences in belief change across conditions were only modest. Consequently, these differences do not provide robust support for the premise that the use of questioning to draw information into participant awareness and the requirement of responding to analysing/synthesising questions results in greater belief change than when participants are presented with salient information didactically. Nevertheless, the Socratic analogue condition did result in significantly greater change in belief than did the control, whereas the didactic condition did not. Therefore, within the limited scope of this study, being an analogue of the therapeutic technique investigated and the study being conducted with a non-clinical sample, the results may be seen to suggest that further investigation of the impact of the Socratic Method upon belief change is warranted.
Non-significant changes in anxiety and reported behaviour were exhibited across all conditions. Additionally, there was no significant difference in size of change in anxiety of behaviour ratings across groups. This suggests that, whilst the online intervention may have successfully resulted in intellectual change in strength of beliefs, associated affective variables were not impacted. It is possible that the use of a predefined belief may have meant that the target cognition lacked the affective salience and personal meaning of cognitions that would typically be targeted by change strategies in treatment and which might result in affective change following reappraisal. Further, the intervention was an analogue of therapy rather than an actual real-time therapy session or ecologically valid representation of the therapeutic techniques investigated and, consequently, this is likely to have reduced the potency of the intervention. It must be noted that the control condition resulted in significant belief change. Evidence suggests that repeated presentation of questionnaires can lead to changes in participants' beliefs, potentially as a result of beliefs becoming more logically consistent with repeated reporting, a phenomenon known as the Socratic effect (Henninger & Wyer, 1976; O'Malley & Thistlewaite, 1980) . As such, the recorded changes across conditions may be seen to result, at least partially, from the Socratic effect. Alternatively, the fact that significant changes in belief ratings occurred across conditions may suggest that the recorded changes in belief Figure 1 Mean belief ratings and standard deviations for "Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will make me ill" across Socratic, didactic psychoeducation, and control conditions (N = 69). * = significant change in belief rating from pre-to-post intervention p < .01. x = significant change in belief rating from pre-to-post intervention p < .05.
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arose as a result of demand characteristics of the experiment and, as such, results must be interpreted with caution. The results of the study do not provide compelling evidence that the processes reflected in the Socratic analogue condition provided clearly superior benefits relative to didactic information-giving. However, as noted above, the Socratic analogue condition was significantly different to the control condition whilst didactic presentation was not, which suggests that the topic is worthy of further investigation.
A number of limitations must be acknowledged. Firstly, employing an online automated version of the Socratic dialogue may not adequately reflect some key aspects of the Socratic Method as applied in clinical reality. Padesky (1993) outlined that Socratic questioning should follow an underlying philosophy of guided discovery, where questioning is conducted in an open and curious manner, towards particular insights, without the therapist aiming to elicit a predefined conclusion (Kazantzis et al., 2014) . Whilst participants were asked an open question which allowed them to generate whatever conclusion appeared valid to them (and therefore, did not reflect a predefined conclusion), as an automated online analogue, it cannot be claimed that the Socratic condition followed a guided discovery approach; the belief was predefined and the questions were not tailored to the idiosyncratic responses of participants. Similarly, other authors have argued that the Socratic dialogue should employ systematic questioning with an aim of facilitating inductive reasoning (Overholser, 1993) . The automated dialogue aimed to facilitate this reasoning process but without real-time monitoring and adaptations of questions to participant responses, the extent to which inductive reasoning took place within the Socratic analogue condition cannot be ascertained. The Socratic analogue followed the process of using questioning to draw participants' attention to information relevant to the target cognition and encouraging participants to synthesise this information with preexisting beliefs (thereby employing key steps involved in the Socratic Method in facilitating thought re-evaluation; e.g., Clark & Egan, 2015; Kennerley, 2007) . However, as an online analogue, the Socratic condition did not include one key aspect of Socratic questioning as defined by Padesky (1993) ; empathic listening. The Socratic analogue condition, therefore, did not reflect a number of aspects of the Socratic Method as it would be applied within CBT and it is possible that elements such as empathic listening and guided discovery may contribute significantly to thought re-evaluation and/or engagement with the topic of discussion.
Additional limitations also need to be considered. The sample was drawn from undergraduate and community populations. Employing a nonclinical sample is common in large scale psychological treatment process research (e.g. Heiniger et al., 2018; McManus et al., 2012) . However, such sampling inherently limits the extent to which the results can be claimed to be generalisable to a clinical population. More specifically, it remains unknown whether different results would emerge where the target cognition reflects a key cognition which generates clinically significant distress and/or reflected a cognition that could be claimed to be personally meaningful (as would be expected in use of the Socratic Method within a clinical setting). Additionally, the present study used a self-report methodology, a common method bias that may have overstated the results (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) . Finally, a small, non-clinical sample was utilised, with a nonequal number of participants across conditions. Nevertheless, as the first study we are aware of to investigate this issue, the findings are of value.
Application of the Socratic Method is, by nature, more time consuming within therapeutic interventions than didactic approaches. A great deal of time and resources are required to train clinicians in its use. Consequently, pragmatic considerations may result in CBT interventions which omit this technique (Clark & Egan, 2015) . However, evidence suggests that the Socratic Method is perceived to be more helpful and be associated with stronger perceived therapeutic alliance, as compared to didactic approaches in CBT (Heiniger et al., 2018) . Furthermore, therapists' use of Socratic questioning has been reported to be associated with improved treatment outcomes in CBT for depression (Braun et al., 2015) . The results of the present study suggest that it would be useful for future extensions of this research to evaluate the use of live, real-time Socratic questions (as opposed to an online analogue) and to target the re-evaluation of cognitions that are more personally meaningful/anxietyprovoking to the individual. Specifically, future research should aim to evaluate this research question with a clinical sample as this may allow for the evaluation of the impact of these techniques in a sample where beliefs are held with greater conviction and where such beliefs may be associated with a greater degree of distress.
